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Abstract.Economic growth is inadvertently connected with human impacts on the 
environment. The currently accepted interpretation is that the intensity of human activities 
and impacts accelerated dramatically in the 1950s or more broadly in the second half of the 
21st century. These claims are not based or a rigorous analysis of data but on impressions. 
The important question for human future is whether these claims are true. Distributions 
describing time dependence of human activities and impacts have now been mathematically 
analysed. Conclusions can be summarised as follows. (1) The intensity of human activities 
and impacts decelerated in the 1950s or more broadly in the second half of the 21st century. 
(2) Distributions describing time dependence of human activities and impacts cannot be 
used to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene because there are no 
suitableintensification landmarks. (3) Mathematical analysis suggests a new interpretation 
of the concept of the Anthropocene. Human activities and impacts did not emerge with high 
intensity at any specific time. They evolved gradually over a long time.  
Keywords.The Anthropocene, Human activities and impacts, Deceleration, Sustainable 
future. 
JEL. A12, C02, C12, F01, Y80. 
 
1. Introduction 
uman activities and impacts on the environment are now so strong (Steffen 
et al., 2004; Nielsen, 2006) that they have been proposed to represent a 
new stage in human history and maybe even a new geological epoch 
(Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000). The aim of the work described here is to present 
results of mathematical analysis of human activities and impacts, referred to 
collectively as anthropogenic signatures. This analysis will be supported by data 
compiled by Ludwig (2014). They represent the updated data used first by Steffen 
et al., (2004). The work reported here was motivated by the following 
considerations.  
(1) Never analysed. Data used originally by Steffen et al., (2004), updated by 
Ludwig (2014) and used again by Steffen et al., (2015), play important role 
in discussions of the Anthropocene but they were never mathematically 
analysed. All conclusions and explanations are based on impressions, but 
impressions can be misleading. “From these considerations then it is clear 
that the earth does not move, and that it does not lie elsewhere than at the 
centre” declared Aristotle in 350 BC (Aristotle, 2012, p.14). However, what 
was so obviously and undeniably clear for Aristotle is now so obviously and 
undeniably incorrect. 
(2) New geological epoch. Human activities and impacts, so well-illustrated by 
these data, are claimed to be now so strong that they are supposed to be 
pushing the Earth System from the Holocene to the Anthropocene (Lentonet 
al., 2008; Steffen et al., 2016). It is, therefore, essential to understand their 
intensity.  
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(3) Acceleration. It is claimed that human activities and impactsaccelerated 
rapidly from around 1950 (Steffen et al., 2004, 2011, 2015; Steffen in ABC, 
2016). This acceleration was supposed to have been so prominent that it 
was described as a skyrocket acceleration (Steffen in ABC, 2016). It is also 
claimed that there was a smaller earlier acceleration described as “take-off 
points sometime in the twentieth century” (Steffen et al., 2004, p.131). The 
claim of prominent accelerations and of the earlier take-off points is based 
entirely on a subjective and visual examination of data. The sharp increase 
in the 1950s in the slopes of the curves, first claimed by Steffen et al., (2004) 
and later repeated in other publications, was never convincingly 
demonstrated.  
(4) Beginning. This claimed, but not proven, acceleration from around 1950 is 
proposed to mark the beginning of the Anthropocene (Steffen et al., 2015; 
Zalasiewiczet al., 2012). The characteristic and fundamental feature of the 
Anthropocene is the apparently recent intensification in anthropogenic 
impacts and activities. If the intensification occurred suddenly, then the 
beginning of the Anthropocene can be determined. However, the 
intensification might have developed gradually. In such a case, the 
beginning of the Anthropocene cannot be determined, or at least it cannot 
be assigned to any recent time. Furthermore, if the beginning of the 
Anthropocene cannot be positively identified in recent time, this concept 
would have to be revised.  
Some distributions describing the increasing intensity of anthropogenic 
signatures start in around 1950 or even later. However, this feature was causing no 
problem for Steffen et al., (2004), who claimed a clear acceleration around the 
1950s, in each presented case, even though there were no data before 1950. This 
feature was also causing no problem to Steffen at al., (2015) who used precisely the 
same set of data (Ludwig, 2014) to repeat the claim of the common accelerations 
and even to suggest that these unproven accelerationscould be used to mark the 
beginning of the Anthropocene. Precisely the same data are also used or referred to 
regularly by members of the Anthropocene Working Group to claim accelerations 
in the 1950s.  
Data compiled by Ludwig do not represent precisely the same set as published 
earlier by Steffen et al., (2004) in the form of diagrams only. For instance, 
McDonald restaurants are not included in the new compilation and it would be for 
Ludwig to explain why the set she has presented is not exactly the same as the set 
published originally by Steffen et al., (2004). However, her compilation represents 
virtually the same setsof data as used by Steffen et al., (2004) but now extended to 
later years. Her compilation wasaccepted by Steffen, et al., (2015) as a better 
representation of the original set, illustrating precisely the same processes as before 
and leading to precisely the same conclusions.  
Out of all the data describing anthropogenic signatures, growth of population 
and economic growth have a special place, not only because they are described by 
an exceptionally wide range of data (for the growth of human population down to 
around 2,000,000 years ago and for the economic growth down to AD 1) but also 
because of their special role in the concept of the Anthropocene.  
The primary driving force of anthropogenic signatures is the growth of human 
population. As observed by Waters et al., (2016, p.aad2622-2) the “increase in the 
consumption of natural resources is closely linked with the growth of the human 
population.” Correlations might not be linear but it is hardly surprising that with 
the gradually increasing population human activities and impacts have been also 
increasing.  
While the primary driving force of anthropogenic activities and impacts appears 
to be the growth of population, their combined intensity is reflected in the 
economic growth, which is closely linked with such anthropogenic signatures as 
the production and consumption of energy, consumption of fertilizers, pollution of 
the atmosphere, land and water, water consumption, land degradation, loss of 
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tropical forests, consumption of marine resources, ocean acidification, stratospheric 
ozone depletion, increased transportation, increased consumption of renewable and 
non-renewable resources, interference with nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, and 
more. Maybe all anthropogenic impacts and activities are embodied in the 
economic growth but if not all, then many of them are. Economic growth appears 
to reflect the combined intensity of anthropogenic impacts and activities. It is hard, 
maybe even impossible, to decouple economic growth from environmental 
impacts. Recent study of this issue resulted in the following conclusion: “It is 
therefore misleading to develop growth-oriented policy around the expectation that 
decoupling is possible” (Ward et al., 2016, p. e0164733-10). 
Thus, by studying economic growth, one can already get an overall information 
about anthropogenic activities and impacts. In particular, one can already get 
information about the beginning of the Anthropocene and whether there was a 
sudden surge in anthropogenic impacts and activities in recent years. Time-
depended distributions of economic growth and of the growth of population are a 
rich source of information about the mechanism of the Anthropocene.  
These two processes have been studied earlier (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 
2016d, 2017a, 2017b) using extensive sets of data of Biraben, 1980; Birdsell, 1972; 
Clark, 1968; Cook, 1960; Deevey, 1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Hassan, 
2002; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; Maddison, 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; 
Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994, United Nations, 1973, 
1999, 2013; US Census Bureau, 2017. Some historical data were also conveniently 
compiled by Manning (2008) and by US Census Bureau (2017).  
Analysis of the remaining anthropogenic signatures is based on data published 
by the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (Ludwig, 2014). References 
to the respective individual sets of data are listed in this compilation. I have also 
included data for the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels (EPI, 2013) to 
study correlation between these emissions and the atmospheric concentration of 
carbon dioxide.  
 
2. Rudiments of the mathematical analysis 
One of the simplest distributions related to anthropogenic signatures is 
hyperbolic growth. It describes, for instance, the historical growth of population 
and the historical economic growth (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a). Hyperbolic 
distributions are described by the following simple equation:  
 
1
( )S t
a kt


.          (1) 
 
where ( )S t  is the size of the growing entity, a and k are positive constants and t
is the time. It is just the reciprocal of a linear function. 
For a good quality data over a sufficiently large range, hyperbolic growth can be 
uniquely identified by the decreasing straight line representing its reciprocal values 
(Nielsen, 2017b): 
 
1
( )
a kt
S t
   ,          (2) 
 
Hyperbolic distributions escape to infinity at a fixed time when /t a k , i.e. 
when their reciprocal values are zero. 
Extended or higher-order hyperbolic growth can be described by the reciprocal 
of higher order polynomials.  
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If restriction for n  is removed, the eqn (3) includes also the first-order 
hyperbolic distribution described by the eqn (1).   
Exponential growth is described by the following equation: 
 
( ) rtS t ce          (4) 
 
where c is the normalisation constant related to the constant of integration and r is 
the growth rate. 
For a good quality data over a sufficiently large range, exponential growth can 
be uniquely identified by a straight line in the semilogarithmic display because  
 
ln ( ) lnS t c rt  .         (5) 
 
Extended or higher-order exponential growth is described by the following 
equation: 
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The normalisation constant is given by 0a .  
Growth rate R is defined as  
 
1 ( )
( )
dS t
R
S t dt
 .          (7) 
 
For a discrete set of values, it is calculated using the following formula: 
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Growth rate plays essential role in the mathematical analysis of data (Nielsen, 
2017b).  
Growth rate can be represented as a function of time or as a function of the size 
of the growing entity. If it is represented as a function of time, then there is a 
general solution to the relevant differential equations, which can be used to 
calculate mathematical distribution describing growth.  
If 
 
1 ( )
( )
( )
dS t
f t
S t dt
 ,         (9) 
 
then  
 
( ) exp ( )S t f t dt  .                  (10) 
 
If growth rate is represented as  
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( )f t a bt  ,                   (11) 
 
then 
 
2( ) exp( 0.5 )S t at bt C   ,                  (12) 
 
where C  is a constant of integration, which is determined by comparing calculated 
curve with data. 
This expression can be presented as  
 
2
0 1 2( ) exp( )S t a a t a t   .                  (13) 
 
It is a second-order exponential distribution. If 1 0a  and 2 0a  , then the 
distribution described by eqn (13) will continue to increase indefinitely with time. 
In this case, the second-order exponential distribution is continually accelerating. If 
1 0a   and 2 0a  , then the distribution described by eqn (13) will be gradually 
decelerating, will reach a maximum and will start to decrease. If 1 0a  and 2 0a  , 
then the distribution described by eqn (13) will be decreasing, will reach a 
minimum and will be then accelerating and increasing indefinitely with time. If 
1 0a   and 2 0a  , then the distribution described by eqn (13) will be continually 
decreasing.   
Parameters 1a  and 2a determine the shape of the distribution, while parameter
0a is just the normalization constant, which has to be determined by comparing the 
calculated distribution with data.       
If growth rate decreases exponentially with time, i.e. if 
 
1 ( )
( )
btdS t ae
S t dt
 ,                   (14) 
 
then (Nielsen, 2017b) 
 
( ) exp bt
a
S t C e
b
 
  
 
.                   (15) 
 
It is a pseudo-logistic growth because, with the increasing time, the size the 
growing entity increases asymptotically to the constant value C . This is one of the 
two types of trajectories, which describe the current growth of the world population 
(Nielsen, 2017b).  
If growth rate depends linearly on the size of the growing entity, i.e. if  
 
0 1
1 dS
a a S
S dt
  ,                   (16) 
 
and if 0 0a   , then (Nielsen, 2017b) 
 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 5(4), R.W. Nielsen, p.295-330. 
300 
0
1
1
0
( )
a t a
S t Ce
a

   
 
,                  (17) 
 
where  
 
0 01
0 0
1 a ta
C e
S a
 
  
 
.                   (18) 
 
If 0 0a   and 1 0a  , i.e. if growth rate is decreasing linearly with the size of 
the growing entity, then eqn (17) describes logistic growth.  
If 1 0a  , then eqn (17) describes a pseudo-hyperbolic growth, which escapes to 
infinity at a fixed time.  
If 0 0a  , then eqn (16) is 
 
1
1 dS
a S
S dt
                    (19) 
 
It describes the first-order hyperbolic growth and has to be solved separately. Its 
solution is by substitution 1Z S . If eqn (19) is expressed as   
 
1 dS
kS
S dt
 ,                    (20) 
 
then its solution is given by eqn (1).  
If k is not constant but is assumed to depend on time, i.e. if k is replaced by 
( )k t , then eqn (20) is 
 
1
( )
dS
k t S
S dt
 ,                    (21) 
 
and its solution is 
 
1
( ) ( )S t k t

  
  .                   (22) 
 
If ( )k t is represented by a polynomial, then the eqn (22) can be expressed as eqn 
(3).  
I shall always use the simplest mathematical descriptions of growth trajectories, 
as described in Table 1.  
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Table 1. The simplest mathematical descriptions of growth rates and the corresponding 
simplest growth trajectories used in the analysis of anthropogenic signatures 
Growth Rate Growth Growth Trajectory 
( )R t r  Exponential ( ) rtS t ce  
1 2( )R t a a t   Second-order 
exponential 
2
0 1 2( ) exp( )S t a a t a t    
( )R S kS  Hyperbolic 1( ) ( )S t a kt    
0 1( )R S a a S   
0 0a  , 1 0a   
Pseudo-hyperbolic 
0
1
1
0
( )
a t a
S t Ce
a

   
 
 
0 1( )R S a a S   
0 0a  , 1 0a   
Logistic 
0
1
1
0
( )
a t a
S t Ce
a

   
 
 
( ) btR t ae  Pseudo-logistic 
( ) exp bt
a
S t C e
b
 
  
 
 
 
Mathematical formulae listed in Table 1 are derived by using the simplest 
representations of growth rates, which are in general linear. However, I have also 
included an exponential representation, which is also relatively simple and applies, 
for instance, to the recent growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2017b).  
When interpreting results of mathematical analysis, it is essential to understand 
that decelerated trajectories should not be interpreted as decreasing trajectories. A 
decelerated trajectory could be still increasing and even accelerating. If a 
decelerated trajectory is increasing and decelerating, it is potentially sustainable but 
if it is accelerating it is not sustainable.  
The decelerated trajectory should not be seen as a solution to the associated 
problems. A good example is the current growth of population. It is well-known 
that the growth of population is now slowing down. The trajectory has been 
decelerated and is decelerating but the predicted maximum of human population of 
12 billion or 15.6 billion (Nielsen, 2017b) might be too high to be sustainable.  
Decelerated and slower trajectories might be offering a better opportunity for 
solving problems but they do not give a guarantee that solutions will be found. 
Solutions might be achievable but not necessarily easy. Even decelerated 
trajectories can lead to serious developments and even to crisis as surely as the 
earlier accelerating trajectories.  
Hyperbolic and pseudo-hyperbolic growth represent accelerating trajectories. 
They both escape to infinity at a fixed time. Such a growth is obviously impossible 
after a certain time and it will be either suddenly terminated or changed to a new 
trajectory. However, exponential growth is also increasing and accelerating and it 
is also unsustainable. Exponential growth has to be also terminated after a certain 
time, even though it does not increase to infinity at a fixed time.  
Logistic and pseudo-logistic growth represent decelerating trajectories. They 
approach an asymptotic maximum and under suitable conditions they can be 
sustainable. However, they can be still unsustainable if the asymptotic maximum is 
too high. 
Second-order exponential growth could be either accelerating or decelerating. 
Conditions have been described earlier but in practice if 2 0a  , then the growth is 
accelerating and is unsustainable. If 2 0a  then the growth is decelerating and 
potentially sustainable.  
The term potentially sustainable describes mathematical property. It describes 
growth, which has a potential of reaching a localised or asymptotic maximum, in 
contrast with other types of growth, which increase indefinitely over unrestricted 
range of time, such as exponential growth, or to infinity at a fixed time, such as 
hyperbolic growth.  
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A potentially sustainable growth is not necessarily sustainable. Mathematically 
possible maximum might never be reached. Alternatively, if a localised maximum 
can be reached, mathematical prediction is that the growth trajectory should start to 
decrease, but such a declining trajectory could be representing an unsustainable 
process. A good example is the marine fish capture (Figure 28), which reached a 
predicted maximum in 1997 and started to follow the mathematically predicted 
decline. The declining fish capture describes an unsustainable process. However, 
decreasing population could be interpreted as representing a sustainable process, 
but only over a certain time. 
The fundamental requirement for the potentially sustainable process to be 
sustainable is that the predicted maximum should be sufficiently low to be 
sustainable. Furthermore, if the predicted localised maximum is reached, then 
depending on the type of the process, the predicted decline should be, if possible, 
closely regulated. A fast decline, or even any decline, might be undesirable.  
 
3. Results of mathematical analysis 
Results of mathematical analysis of anthropogenic signatures are shown in 
Figures 1-32 in the Appendix. Five of these signatures contain natural components. 
They are: atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, atmospheric concentration 
of nitrous oxide, atmospheric concentration of methane, hydrogen ion 
concentration is sea water and temperature anomaly. The remaining 19 signatures 
are of purely anthropogenic origin.  Short description of the results of mathematical 
analysis is presented below.  
 
1. Growth of human population: 
 Figures 1, 3 and 4. 
 Data are from AD 1. 
 Initially, hyperbolic growth (accelerating). 
 1950 – minor but temporary boosting. 
 1963 – deceleration and diversion to a slower and decelerating trajectory. 
 No major acceleration in the 1950s or after 1950 claimed by Steffen et al., (2004, 
2011, 2015) and Steffen (in ABC, 2016) but major deceleration around the same 
time. 
 No earlier take-off point “sometime in the twentieth century” claimed by Steffen 
et al., (2004, p. 131). 
 No abrupt acceleration around the time of the Industrial Revolution claimed by 
Steffen et al., (2011). 
 No distinctive landmarks that could be used to mark the beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
 For the beginning of anthropogenic activities and impacts, which have led to their 
recent strong intensity, the phenomenon described as the Anthropocene, one has to 
look before the time of the Industrial Revolution, even before AD 1 and most 
likely to the early beginning of genus Homo around 2.5 million years ago (Nielsen, 
2017a). It was a gradual evolution. 
 The recent fast growth of population is the natural continuation of the historical 
hyperbolic growth (see Figure 3). There was no sudden transition from slow to fast 
growth.  
2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 
 Figures 2 and 5. 
 Data are from AD 1. 
 Initially, hyperbolic growth (accelerating). 
 1950 – deceleration and diversion to a slower trajectory. 
 The new trajectory was initially decelerating but is now approaching 
asymptotically an accelerating exponential growth. 
 No acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration around the same time. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
 No abrupt acceleration around the time of the Industrial Revolution. 
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 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
 For the beginning of anthropogenic activities and impacts, which have led to their 
recent strong intensity, one has to look well before the time of the Industrial 
Revolution. 
 The recent fast economic growth is the natural continuation of the historical 
hyperbolic growth (see Figure 5). There was no sudden transition from the slow to 
fast growth.  
3. Income per capita (GDP/cap): 
 Figures 6 and 7. 
 Data are from AD 1. 
 Initially, linearly-modulated hyperbolic growth (accelerating).  
 1950 – deceleration and diversion to a slower trajectory 
 No acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration in 1950. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
4. Foreign direct investment: 
 Data from 1970. 
 Figures 8 and 9. 
 Initially, second-order exponential growth (accelerating). 
 2000 – deceleration and diversion to a slower pattern of growth. 
 No abrupt acceleration within this range of time. 
5. Urban population: 
 Data from 1750. 
 Figures 10 and 11. 
 Initially, pseudo-hyperbolic growth (accelerating) 
 1960 – deceleration and diversion to a slower and decelerating second-order 
exponential trajectory.  
 No acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration around the same time. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
6. Consumption of primary energy: 
 Data from 1750. 
 Figure 12. 
 Initially, growth hyperbolic (accelerating). 
 1945 – deceleration and diversion to a slower and decelerating second-order 
exponential trajectory. 
 No acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration around the same time. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
7. Consumption of fertilizers: 
 Data from 1900. 
 Figure 13. 
 Initially, second-order exponential growth (accelerating). 
 1973 – deceleration and diversion to a slower trajectory. 
 1988 – growth reached unexpected maximum and started to decrease. 
 1993 – growth diverted to an even slower and continually decelerating second-
order exponential trajectory. 
 No acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration around the same time. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
8. Large dams: 
 Data from 1750. 
 Figures 15 and 16. 
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 Initially, growth was increasing monotonically along a second-order exponential 
trajectory (accelerating).   
 1965 – deceleration and diversion to a decelerating logistic trajectory.  
 No acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration around the same time. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
9. Water consumption: 
 Data from 1901. 
 Figure 17. 
 Initially, hyperbolic growth (accelerating). 
 1979 – deceleration and diversion to a slowly accelerating exponential growth. 
 No acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration around the same time. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
10. Paper production: 
 Data from 1961. 
 Figure 18. 
 Decelerating trajectory. 
 Relatively short time range but no acceleration within this range. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
11. Transportation: 
 Data from 1963. 
 Figure 19. 
 Decelerating trajectory. 
 Relatively short time range but no sudden acceleration within this range. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
12. Telecommunication: 
 Data from 1960. 
 Figure 20. 
 2000 – deceleration and diversion to a decelerating trajectory.  
 Relatively short time range but no sudden acceleration within this range. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
13. International tourism: 
 Data from 1950. 
 Figure 21. 
 Decelerating trajectory 
 Relatively short time range but no sudden acceleration within this range. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
14. Atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide:  
 Data from 1750.  
 Figure 22. 
 Anthropogenic and natural contributions. 
 1750-1965 – second-order exponential growth (accelerating). 
 1965 – acceleration and diversion to a more rapidly accelerating second-order 
exponential growth. This feature cannot be used to mark the beginning of the 
Anthropocene because it contains both natural and anthropogenic components. 
15. Carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels: 
 Data from 1751. 
 Figure 23. 
 Decelerating trajectory. No acceleration in the 1950s. 
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 No earlier take-off point. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
16. Atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide (N2O): 
 Data from 1750. 
 Figure 24. 
 Anthropogenic and natural components. 
 1750-1850 – a decreasing, second-order exponential distribution (decelerating). 
 1850 – growth accelerated and diverted to a continually accelerating pseudo-
hyperbolic trajectory. 
 No abrupt acceleration in the 1950s but only around 1850. However, this 
acceleration cannot be used to mark the beginning of the Anthropocene because 
concentration of nitrous oxide contains natural components.  
17. Atmospheric concentration of methane (CH4): 
 Data from 1750. 
 Figure 25. 
 Anthropogenic and natural contributions. 
 Initially, pseudo-hyperbolic growth until 1990 (accelerating). 
 1980 – deceleration and diversion to a slower and decelerating second-order 
exponential trajectory. 
 2006 – predicted maximum. 
 No acceleration in the 1950s. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
 Currently, possible acceleration. 
18. Loss of the stratospheric ozone: 
 Data from 1956. 
 Figure 26. 
 Initially, loss of stratospheric ozone was increasing exponentially, accelerating at 
the rate of 6.45% per year and doubling every 11 years. 
 1992 – deceleration. 
 Future trajectory is hard to predict because of the combination of the poor-quality 
data and their short range. 
 Relatively short time range but no abrupt acceleration within this range. 
19. Ocean acidification: 
 Data from 1850. 
 Figure 27. 
 Anthropogenic and natural contributions. 
 1850-1965 – slowly-increasing hyperbolic trajectory (accelerating) 
 From 1965 – a faster-increasing hyperbolic trajectory (accelerating) 
 Clear sudden acceleration around 1965, which cannot be used in support of the 
sudden increase in the intensity of anthropogenic impacts because of the 
combination of natural and anthropogenic contributions to ocean acidification.  
 No earlier take-off point. 
20. Marine fish capture: 
 Data from 1950. 
 Figure 28. 
 Decelerating trajectory. 
 1997 – predicted maximum followed by decline. 
 Relatively short time range but no abrupt acceleration within this range. 
21. Shrimp production: 
 Data from 1950. 
 Figure 29. 
 1950-1990 – accelerating trajectory. 
 1990 – deceleration and diversion to a slower exponential trajectory. 
 Relatively short time range but no abrupt acceleration within this time. 
22. Loss of tropical forests: 
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 Data from 1750. 
 Figure 30. 
 1750-1960 – exponential trajectory (accelerating). 
 1960 – deceleration and diversion to a much slower exponential trajectory. 
 No acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration around the same time. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
23. Agricultural land area: 
 Data from 1750.  
 Figure 31. 
 1750-1960 – accelerating trajectory. 
 1960 – deceleration and diversion to a decelerating, second-order trajectory. 
 No acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration around the same time. 
 No earlier take-off point. 
 No clear feature, which could be used to determine the recent beginning of the 
Anthropocene. 
24. Temperature anomaly: 
 Data from 1850. 
 Figure 32. 
 Contains natural and anthropogenic components 
 Strongly irregular  
 1850-1909 – decreasing 
 1909-1944 – increasing 
 1944-1974 – decreasing 
 1974-2007 – increasing 
 2007-2013 – levelling off 
 Future temperature anomaly unpredictable.  
 
4. Discussion 
A striking and unexpected result of the mathematical analysis presented here 
and summarised in Table 2, is the common and systematic deceleration in the 
intensity of purely anthropogenic signatures in the second half of the 20th century, 
commencing from around 1950. Trajectories, which were previously accelerating, 
began to be diverted to slower patterns of growth. This striking phenomenon could 
be described as the Great Deceleration.  
Mathematical analysis demonstrates consistently thatthere were no sharp 
accelerations claimed by Steffen et al.,(2004, 2011, 2015) and by Steffen (in ABC, 
2016) around 1950. Using precisely the same set of anthropogenic signatures as 
published by Ludwig (2014), Steffen at al., (2015) repeated their earlier claim of 
the “post-1950 acceleration in the Earth System” (Steffen et al., 2015, p.81). It is 
remarkable that the same data show systematic decelerations at the precisely the 
same time when the dramatic accelerations (Steffen et al., 2004, 2011, 2015) or 
skyrocket accelerations (Steffen in ABC, 2016) were supposed to have happened.  
These diametrically different conclusions can be easily explained. Certain 
empirical distributions can be strongly misleading and even the most respectable 
scholars can make a mistake with their interpretations. The best way to interpret 
correctly empirical distributions is to analyse them mathematically.  
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Table 2.aThe Great Deceleration. Data demonstrate systematic decelerations in the intensity 
of anthropogenic signature and the absence of the earlier take-off points. 
Signature Data From Initial Recent Boost Decel. Figures Sharp Accel. Take-off 
Population AD 1 A D 1950
b 
1963
 
1, 3, 4 X X 
GDP AD 1 A A
c 
 1950 2, 5 X X 
GDP/cap AD 1 A A
c 
 1950 6, 7 X X 
FDI 1970 A U  2000 8, 9 (X) ND 
Urban Pop. 1750 A D  1960 10, 11 X X 
Energy 1750 A D  1945 12 X X 
Fertilizers 1900 A D  1973 13, 14 X X 
Large Dams 1750 A D  1965 15, 16 X X 
Water 1901 A A
c,d 
 1979 17 X X 
Paper 1961 D D  1961
 
18 (X) ND 
Transportation 1963 D D  1963
 
19 (X) ND 
Telecom. 1960 A D 1991
b 
2000 20 (X) ND 
Tourism 1950 D D  1950
 
21 (X) ND 
CO2 from Fuels  1751 D D  1770
g 
23 X X 
Ozone 1956 A D  1992 26 (X) ND 
Marine Fish  1950 D D  1950
 
28 (X) ND 
Shrimp Prod. 1950 A A
c,e 
 1989 29 (X) ND 
Tropical Forests 1750 A A
c,f 
 1960 30 X X 
Arable Land 1750 A D 1850
h 
1960 31 X X 
Data From – data discussed in this publication; Initial – initial growth trajectory; Recent – recent 
growth trajectory; Boost – insignificant boosting; Decel. – strong deceleration; Sharp Accel. – 
acceleration in the 1950s claimed by Steffen et al., (2004, 2011, 2015) and by Steffen (in ABC, 
2016); Take-off claimed by Steffen et al., (2004); GDP – Gross Domestic Product; FDI – Foreign 
Direct Investment; A – accelerating growth; D – decelerating growth; U – decelerated and strongly 
unstable growth; X – no sudden acceleration in the 1950s, claimed by Steffen et al., (2004, 2011, 
2015) and by Steffen (in ABC, 2016); no earlier take-off point claimed by Steffen et al., (2004); (X) – 
no data before 1950 but no “post-1950 acceleration” claimed by Steffen et al., (2015, p.81) within the 
range of available data; ND – no earlier data to claim (Steffen et al., 2004) or to check the existence 
of the claimed take-off points “sometime in the twentieth century (Steffen et al., 2004, p.131). a) – 
only anthropogenic signatures are listed. b) – minor and temporary boosting followed by a strong 
deceleration.  c) – significantly slower than the initial trajectory. d) – slow acceleration at the rate of 
only 1% per year.  e) – fast acceleration at the rate of 8.8% per year.  f) – slow acceleration at the rate 
of only 0.8% per year. g) – emissions were constant between 1751 and 1770; h) –insignificant boosting 
of exponential growth from 0.5% to 0.8% per year followed from 1960 by strong deceleration. 
 
It appears that Steffen knew all the time that there were no accelerations in 
human activities and impacts at any specific time. When informed about my 
intention to analyse data mathematically his response was: “My recollection was 
that only the population graph showed an acceleration in the mathematical sense” 
(Steffen, 2017). However, even population graph did not show a prominent 
acceleration at any specific time but only minor boosting in 1950 followed by 
deceleration from around 1963 (see Figure 4). This minor boosting cannot be used 
to mark the beginning of the Anthropocene because it was not only insignificant 
but also it quickly faded away and was replaced by a continuing deceleration in the 
growth of human population. 
If there was no acceleration at any specific time, then there was obviously no 
transition from a slow to fast growth at any specific time. However, if there was no 
such transition, then it is also obvious that there is nothing in this set of 
anthropogenic signatures that can be used to mark the time of the transition from 
less intensive to more intensive human activities and impacts, and consequently 
nothing to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene. The sooner this simple 
conclusion could be accepted, the sooner progress could be made in a better 
understanding of the Anthropocene. 
The word “acceleration” is so well known that there is no ambiguity about its 
meaning. It is the increase in the speed or rate that something happens. Every 
acceleration in empirical distributions is in the mathematical sense. To claim that it 
is not, would be unconvincing.  
Acceleration can be monotonically continuing or sudden. There could be 
trajectories accelerating all the time and hyperbolic trajectories describing the 
historical growth of population or historical economic growth are good examples 
of such continually accelerating trajectories. For them, acceleration is directly 
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proportional to the size of the growing entity. The better-known exponential 
growth is also continually accelerating.  
For such trajectories, acceleration is occurring monotonically all the time and it 
is impossible to find or to claim any specific time along these trajectories to mark a 
clear change in the acceleration because there is no such sudden change.  
Sudden acceleration is distinctly different. It marks a clear event in time when 
there is a change in the pattern of growth. Every time acceleration or increase is 
claimed at a certain specific time, it is always a sudden acceleration and it is also 
acceleration in the mathematical sense.  
Thus, for instance, if acceleration is claimed to have occurred in the 1950s or at 
the time of the Industrial Revolution, it is acceleration in the mathematical sense. If 
a take-off is claimed sometime during the second half of the twentieth century 
(Steffen et al., 2004), it is also acceleration in the mathematical sense. There is no 
other interpretation.   
Sudden acceleration does not have to be followed by a continuing acceleration. 
It can be even followed by a continuing deceleration. However, every time an 
intensification of growth is claimed as having occurred at a certain specific time or 
within a relatively short range of time, it is acceleration in the mathematical sense 
and there is no way around it. 
In the original publication of Steffen et al., (2004), it is claimed that there was a 
sudden acceleration in anthropogenic activities and impacts. “Sharp changes in the 
slopes of the curves occur around the 1950sin each case and illustrate how the past 
50 years have been a period of dramatic and unprecedented change in human 
history” (Steffen et al., 2004, p.132; italics added).  
These sharp changes around the 1950s are defined explicitly as sharp 
accelerations on page 131 of the same book. The described accelerations are 
explicitly used in the mathematical sense not only because they describe increase at 
a certain specific time but also because they refer to a mathematical property, to 
sharp changes in the slopes of the curves. Many examples of the claimed 
accelerations in the 1950s or after 1950, in explicitly mathematical sense, can be 
found in the published literature. The fundamental point is that there were no such 
accelerations. 
Results of mathematical analysis presented here do not debate the elusive and 
confusing concept of the Great Acceleration (Hibbard, et al., 2007). Sometimes this 
concept is interpreted as acceleration but sometimes it is not. Even though Steffen 
at al. (2004) claimed accelerations around 1950, now Steffen claims that the Great 
Acceleration is not acceleration (Steffen, 2018). However, acceleration around 
1950 for the Great Acceleration is routinely claimed.  
The concept of the Great Acceleration, confusing as it may be, has no impact 
whatever on the conclusions based on the results of the presented here 
mathematical analysis that at the precisely the same time or within precisely the 
same range of time, when accelerations (in the mathematical sense) in the intensity 
of anthropogenic signatures are repeatedly claimed in the published literature, there 
were in fact decelerations, the phenomenon described here as the Great 
Deceleration (in the mathematical sense, and in the commonly understood sense).   
The claim of the “increasing rates of change in human activity since the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution” (Steffen et al., 2011, p.851) describes also 
acceleration in the mathematical sense, because it was supposed to have been an 
increase at a certain specific range of time. This claim is now also contradicted by 
the mathematical analysis of data.   
Industrial Revolution did not occur precisely in a certain year but over a number 
of years, between about 1760 and 1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994). In order to 
see a possible intensification in the empirical distributions describing human 
activities and impacts, it is necessary to have data going well before 1760. The 
majority of indicators used by Steffen et al., (2004, 2011, 2015) do not extend that 
far in time to support their claim of the intensification caused by the Industrial 
Revolution. The exceptions are only data describing the growth of human 
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population and economic growth. Analysis of these data demonstrates conclusively 
that Industrial Revolution had no impact on shaping growth trajectories (see 
Figures 3-5). The growth was monotonic without any form of disturbance, any 
form of acceleration, around the time of the Industrial Revolution.  
There is also nothing in the data used by Steffen et al., (2004, 2011, 2015) to 
support the claim that “Many human activities reached take-off points sometime in 
the twentieth century” (Steffen et al., 2004, p.131). This claim is not based on a 
rigorous analysis of data but on impressions prompted perhaps by a desire to see 
such intensifications. 
Intensive human activities and impacts are real. For the first time in human 
history, humans have profound global impacts on the environment. For the first 
time, humans are shaping their own future and, to a certain degree, even the future 
of our planet. However, there is no clear evidence that these profound global 
activities and impacts commenced around the time of the Industrial Revolution or 
in the 1950s or around any other recent specific time.  
 
5. Further research 
Evidence supporting the concept of the Great Deceleration is overwhelmingly 
strong. All purely anthropogenic distributions were either diverted to decelerating 
trajectories or they were already decelerating over the entire range of the available 
data. In this last group, global paper production wasdecelerating from 1961, global 
transportation from 1963, international tourism from 1950, global emissions of 
carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels from 1770 and global marine fish capture 
from 1950.  It would be interesting to extend this study to other data. 
When looking for other examples of anthropogenic activities and impacts it is 
essential to understand that fast-increasing trajectories should not be automatically 
interpreted as accelerating trajectories. Such interpretation is, perhaps 
unintentionally, suggested by the unfortunate term of the “Great Acceleration” 
(Hibbard, et al., 2007) and only through a private correspondence one can discover 
that the Great Acceleration is not an acceleration. However, published literature 
suggests that it is. 
Accelerating trajectories are characterised by a positive constant or increasing 
growth rate. Decelerating trajectories are characterised by a decreasing growth rate. 
If the growth rate is positive and decreasing, then the corresponding growth 
trajectory will be decelerating but it will be still increasing. Depending on the value 
of the growth rate, it can be also increasing fast.  
Mathematical analysis is essential to see whether a given trajectory is 
accelerating or decelerating, particularly if data are over a relatively short range of 
time. Furthermore, for a small range of data, it might be impossible to decide 
whether an accelerating trajectory is a result of an earlier deceleration. Table 2 lists 
a few examples of such accelerating trajectories, which resulted from an earlier 
deceleration. Economic growth is one of them. It was originally accelerating along 
a fast-increasing hyperbolic trajectory. It was deceleratingfrom around 1950 and 
now is accelerating again but along a significantly slower trajectory than before 
1950 (Nielsen, 2015). This new accelerating trajectory is less critical than the 
earlier hyperbolic trajectory and it is easier to divert it to a decelerating trajectory. 
Decelerating trajectories do not give a guarantee of a sustainable future but only 
increase its chance. On the other hand, accelerating trajectories, if continued, lead 
to unsustainable future. Trends can also change their characteristic features. 
For instance, from around 1963, growth rate of the world population was 
steadily decreasing. Growth started to decelerate but the size of the world 
population continues to increase, and even to increase fast.Furthermore, this 
decelerating trajectory does not guarantee that the growth of population is going to 
be sustainable. The optimistically predicted maximum is around 12 billion (United 
Nations 2015, Nielsen, 2017b). However, a more likely outcome is an asymptotic 
maximum of 15.6 billion (Nielsen, 2017b). Will any of these predicted maxima be 
sustainable? However, growth rate is now decreasing so slowly that it might 
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become constant. If it is going to remain constant, growth of the world population 
will be accelerating along an exponential trajectory and will be unsustainable, 
unless in due time it is going to change again to a suitably fast decelerating 
trajectory.   
Growth rate for the growth of population in China was decreasing. Growth 
trajectory was decelerating but it was still increasing. However, from around 2008, 
growth rate started to hover around a constant value (World Bank, 2017). If this 
pattern is going to continue, growth of population in China will continue to be 
accelerating along an exponential trajectory and the growth of population will be 
unsustainable. 
World economic growth has now settled around an accelerating exponential 
trajectory. Such a growth, if continued, is unsustainable. However, the currently 
constant growth rate might, in due time, start to decrease when, for instance, 
economic stress is going to reach a high level. If this is going to happen, the current 
accelerating trajectory will be changed to a decelerating trajectory with a prospect, 
but not with a guarantee, of a sustainable future.   
Another issue, which could be further investigated, apart from studying other 
anthropogenic signatures, is to try to explain the mechanism of the Great 
Deceleration. There could be various contributing factors such as improved 
environmental management, limits of the Earth System and cross interaction 
between various anthropogenic activities and impacts. Each anthropogenic 
signature is also probably characterised by a different mechanism of growth. The 
distinction should be also made between potentially harmful and potentially 
beneficial human activities such as the increasing use of alternative sources of 
energy or the increasing use of electronic media, which gradually replaces paper 
production. All such studies could help to asses a chance of a sustainable future. 
Self-regulation is not necessarily imposed by an improvement in human 
interaction with Nature or by the limits and boundaries of the Earth System. Even 
with unlimited resources, there could be still a limit to growth. For instance, world 
economic growth was increasing along a hyperbolic trajectory but from 1950 it 
started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. This deceleration did not happen 
because all nations in the world agreed amiably and unanimously to stop following 
the fast-accelerating hyperbolic trajectory and to slow down their economic 
activities. There was no such mutual agreement. This deceleration was also not 
imposed by the critical boundaries of the Earth System because economic growth 
continues to increase and even to accelerate. The deceleration occurred 
spontaneously probably because it was simply impossible to cope with such a fast-
hyperbolic growth. Economic growth started to follow a decelerating trajectory but 
gradually its growth rate approached asymptotically a smaller constant value, 
which describes exponential growth (Nielsen, 2015). It is a slower growth than the 
previous hyperbolic growth but accelerating. It is also an unsustainable growth and 
it will have to be terminated either by a diversion to a slower trajectory or by a 
collapse. Maybe this termination will be dictated by ecological limits but maybe 
not. When, in due time, exponential growth is going to lead to a high-intensity 
production and consumption, it will be no longer supported. There is a limit to how 
much can be produced and consumed over a certain time and this limit does not 
necessarily depends on the availability of natural resources or on a decision of 
some kind of an international economic tribunal. However, with limitations of 
natural resources, limit to growth can be reached earlier. Self-regulation might be 
helpful but controlled regulation is likely to produce better results.    
A puzzling feature revealed by the current analysis is the sudden acceleration in 
the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration around 1965, which coincides with 
ocean acidification but is not correlated with the carbon dioxide emissions from 
burning fossil fuels. Reasons for this sudden acceleration are unclear. 
Without a successful control of anthropogenic activities, the concept of the 
Anthropocene might fade into insignificance in the future. The Earth will survive 
without humans and so will also many life forms. They will probably even thrive 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 5(4), R.W. Nielsen, p.295-330. 
311 
without humans. However, if humans are still going to be around, they will 
probably worry only about how to survive rather than about debating the beginning 
of the Anthropocene and proving that it is a new geological epoch. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Accelerations of the anthropogenic signatures in the 1950s, claimed by Steffen 
et al., (2004, 2011, 2015) and by Steffen (in ABC, 2016), never happened. There 
were also no “take-off points sometime in the twentieth century” claimed by 
Steffen et al.,(2004, p.131) and no acceleration at the time of the Industrial 
Revolution claimed by Steffen et al., (2011). There is nothing in the studied here 
anthropogenic signatures that can be used to determine the beginning of the 
Anthropocene. It is also interesting that at the precisely the same time when the 
massive and dramatic acceleration is repeatedly claimed, i.e. in the 1950s, there 
was in fact massive deceleration in the intensity of human activities and impacts 
described here as the Great Deceleration. The Great Acceleration cannot be used to 
mark the beginning of the Anthropocene because the beginning of the 
Anthropocene is supposed to be characterised by a transition from weak to strong 
anthropogenic activities and impacts, not from strong to weak. 
Results of mathematical analysis presented here suggest a new interpretation of 
the Anthropocene. It is not a phenomenon that emerged at a certain recent time but 
a phenomenon that have been evolving over a long time until gradually and 
monotonically reached its strong intensity in recent years. Human activities and 
impacts were increasing in concert with the growth of human population and they 
are reflected in the economic growth. In order to understand the evolution of these 
activities and impacts, and consequently, in order to understand the Anthropocene, 
it is essential to understand the growth of human population and the economic 
growth in the past 2,000,000 years (Nielsen, 2017a). This issue will be discussed in 
a forthcoming publication. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 1.Growth of human population. Data describing growth of the world population 
(Maddison, 2010) follow closely monotonically increasing hyperbolic distribution defined 
by parameters 08.724 10a  and 34.267 10k  . Growth of population was not 
exponential, as expected by Malthus (1798) but hyperbolic. There was no abrupt 
acceleration in the 1950s or around any recent time, no sudden intensification, which could 
be used to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene. There was also no earlier take-off 
point. 
 
Figure 2.Economic growth. Data describing growth of the world Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Maddison, 2010), expressed in billions of 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, 
are compared with the monotonically increasing hyperbolic distribution ( 21.716 10a    
and 68.671 10k  ). There was no abrupt acceleration in the 1950s and no earlier take-off 
point. 
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Figure 3. Growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2016b, 2017a) during the AD time. 
Data from a complete set are used (see text). Calculated trajectory accounts for the major 
transition between two hyperbolic trajectories (425 BC – AD 510) and for a minor 
disturbance of the hyperbolic growth, which occurred between AD 1195 and AD 1470. 
Parameters describing these calculations are listed in the earlier publications (Nielsen, 
2016b, 2017a). Industrial Revolution had no impact on the growth trajectory. The rate of 
growth did not begin to rise above the previous level around the time of the Industrial 
Revolution, as claimed by Steffen et al., (2011). There was no abrupt acceleration in the 
1950s claimed by Steffen et al. (2004,2011, 2015) and by Steffen (in ABC, 2016) or around 
any recent time, no sudden intensification, which could be used to determine the beginning 
of the Anthropocene. There was also no earlier take-off “sometimes in the twentieth 
century” (Steffen et al., 2004, p. 131). The perceived sudden increase seen in Figure 1 is 
just the natural continuation of the monotonically increasing hyperbolic growth. 
 
 
Figure 4.Magnified section of the growth of population presented in Figure 3. Now it can 
be seen more clearly that what might have appeared as a sudden population explosion in 
Figure 1, is just the natural continuation of the monotonic growth. From 1500 to 1950 – 
monotonically increasing hyperbolic growth. Around 1950 – minor boosting. Around 1963 
– deceleration. Industrial Revolution had no impact on the growth trajectory. The rate of 
growth did not begin to rise above the previous level around the time of the Industrial 
Revolution, as claimed by Steffen et al. (2011). There was no major sudden acceleration 
claimed in the 1950s (Steffen et al., 2004, 2011, 2011; Steffen in ABC, 2016) but only a 
minor and temporary boosting. There is nothing in the data that can be used to mark the 
beginning of the Anthropocene. 
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Figure 5.Data for the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between AD 1 and 2008 
(Maddison, 2010), expressed in billions of 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, are 
compared with the monotonically increasing hyperbolic distribution. Between AD 1000 and 
1950 – monotonically increasing hyperbolic growth. Around 1950 – deceleration and 
diversion to a slower trajectory. Industrial Revolution had no impact on shaping economic 
growth trajectory, even in Western Europe and even in the United Kingdom (Nielsen, 
2016a, 2016d). The rate of growth did not begin to rise above the previous level around the 
time of the Industrial Revolution, as claimed by Steffen et al. (2011). There was no sudden 
acceleration around 1950 or around any other time, no sudden intensification, which could 
be used to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene. On the contrary, from 1950 
economic growth started to follow a slower trajectory. There was also no earlier take-off 
point. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution describing income per capita (GDP/cap) obtained by dividing 
distributions shown in Figures 1 and 2.  The best fit to the data is represented by a 
monotonically increasing linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution (Nielsen, 2017c). This 
distribution is even more deceptive than hyperbolic distribution shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
Income per capita was approximately constant in the past but most recently it was fast 
increasing. However, there was no sudden transition from the slow to fast growth. The 
perceived sudden increase is an illusion created by the strongly deceptive hyperbolic-like 
distribution. Growth was increasing monotonically all the time. There is no mathematically 
determinable beginning of the fast increase, no sudden change in the slope of the curve 
describing the growth of income per capita. 
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Figure 7.Extended data describing growth of income per capita (GDP/cap) (Maddison, 
2010) are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution (Nielsen, 2017c). 
From AD 1 to 1950 – monotonically increasing linearly modulated hyperbolic growth. 
Around 1950 – deceleration and diversion to a slower trajectory. Growth was not 
accelerated around 1950. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.Global foreign direct investment (FDI) in trillions of the current US$. 1970-2000 – 
second-order exponential growth ( 4
0 1.380 10a  , 
1
1 1.405 10a    and 
3
2 3.575 10a
 ). 2000 – deceleration. There was no acceleration in the 1950s. 
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Figure 9.Global foreign direct investment displayed using semilogarithmic scales of 
reference, showing more clearly that growth was oscillating around a monotonically 
increasing trajectory and that from around 2000 it started to follow a generally slower 
pattern of growth. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.Growth of urban population. 1750-1960 – pseudo-hyperbolic trajectory described 
by parameters 71.536 10C   , 31 7.658 10a
  and  22 2.798 10a
 . Around 1960 – 
deceleration and diversion to a slower, second-order exponential trajectory described by 
parameters 20 4.345 10a  
1
1 4.133 10a
  and 52 9.776 10a
  There was no 
sudden acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration. There was also no earlier take-off point. 
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Figure 11.Semilogarithmic display of the growth of global urban population showing even 
more clearly the monotonic growth until 1960 and deceleration around that year. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.Global consumption of primary energy in exajoules [EJ]. 1750-1950 – hyperbolic 
growth( 15.356 10a   and  42.705 10k  ). 1945 – deceleration and diversion to a 
slower, second-order exponential trajectory ( 20 3.955 10a   , 
1
1 3.799 10a
 and 
5
2 8.954 10a
  ). There was no acceleration in the 1950s but deceleration in 1950. 
There was also no earlier take-off point. 
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Figure 13.Global consumption of fertilizers (in million tonnes). 1900-1973 - second-order 
exponential trajectory ( 20 7.788 10a  , 
1
1 8.646 10a
  and 42 2.393 10a
 ). 
1973 – deceleration and diversion to a slower trajectory. 1988 – maximum. 1988-1993 – 
decreasing trajectory. 1993-2010 – even slower and decelerating second-order exponential 
trajectory ( 20 6.341 10a  
1
1 6.195 10a
 and 42 1.500 10a
  ). There was no 
acceleration in the 1950s and no earlier take-off point. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.Global consumption of fertilizers (in million tonnes) is shown here using 
semilogarithmic scales of reference. This diagram shows even better that there was no 
acceleration in the 1950s and no earlier take-off point. 
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Figure 15.Global number of existing large dams, in thousands. 1750-1965 – second-order 
exponential trajectory ( 20 2.734 10a  , 
1
1 3.208 10a
  and 52 9.305 10a
 ). 
1965 – deceleration and diversion to a slower, logistic trajectory ( 727.642 10C  , 
2
0 8.689 10a
 and 31 4.599 10a
  ). There was no acceleration in the 1950 but 
deceleration and there was no earlier take-off point. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.Global number of existing large dams in thousands displayed here by using 
semilogarithmic scales of reference. This diagram shows even better that there was no 
acceleration in the 1950s, but deceleration, and no earlier take-off point. 
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Figure 17.Global consumption of water, in cubic kilometres. 1901-1979 – hyperbolic 
growth( 13.025 10a   and  21.513 10k  ). 1979 – deceleration and diversion to a 
slower, exponential trajectory ( 93.310 10c   ,  21.041 10r  ). There was no 
acceleration in the 1950sand no earlier take-off point. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18.Paper production. 1961-2010 – gradually decelerating, second-order, exponential 
trajectory ( 20 9.279 10a   , 
1
1 9.072 10a

 , 42 2.202 10a
  ). There was no 
sudden acceleration within this range of time. 
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Figure 19.Global transportation. 1963-2010 – gradually decelerating second-order 
exponential trajectory ( 20 9.279 10a   , 
1
1 9.072 10a

 and 42 2.202 10a
  ). 
There was no sudden acceleration within this range of time. 
 
 
 
Figure 20.Global telecommunication (billions of landlines and subscriptions). 1960-1991 – 
exponential growth (
513.944 10c  , 25.798 10r

 ). 1991-2000 – second-order, 
exponential trajectory ( 4
0 2.945 10a  , 
1
1 2.964 10a    and 
3
2 7.457 10a
 ). 
2000 – deceleration and diversion to a slower, second-order exponential trajectory 
described by parameters 3
0 4.771 10a   , 
0
1 4.622 10a   and 
3
2 1.118 10a
  . There was no prominent sudden acceleration within this range of 
time but deceleration in 2000. 
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Figure 21.Global international tourism. 1950-2010 – a decelerating, second-order 
exponential trajectory ( 30 2.060 10a  , 
0
1 2.030 10a  ,
4
2 4.982 10a
  ). There 
was no sudden increase within this range of time. 
 
 
Figure 22.Atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. 1750-1965 – second-order 
exponential trajectory ( 10 1.481 10a  , 
2
1 1.048 10a
  , 62 2.991 10a
 ). 
Around 1965 – acceleration and diversion to a faster second-order exponential trajectory 
described by parameters 10 7.835 10a  , 
2
1 7.721 10a
  and 52 2.049 10a
 . 
This is a good example of a signature, which shows sudden acceleration in the 1950s, the 
type of accelerations claimed by Steffen et al. (2004, 2011, 2015) and be Steffen (in ABC, 
2016). Unfortunately, this example cannot be used in support of their claim of a sudden 
acceleration in anthropogenic signature because atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide is made not only of anthropogenic but also of natural components. 
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Figure 23.Global emission of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels (EPI, 2013). 1770-
2010 – growth oscillates around a gradually decelerating second-order exponential 
trajectory ( 20 1.432 10a   , 
1
1 1.230 10a
 , 52 2.346 10a
  ). This distribution 
shows that the sudden acceleration in the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration around 
1965 cannot be explained by the carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels. 
 
 
Figure 24.Atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide (N2O), expressed in parts per billion 
[ppb]. 1750-1850 – second-order exponential trajectory ( 10 4.727 10a
  , 
3
1 6.898 10a
  , 62 1.956 10a
  ). 1850 – acceleration and diversion to a pseudo-
hyperbolic trajectory ( 142.406 10C   , 20 1.198 10a
  , 51 4.546 10a
 ). Nitrous 
oxide concentration is also made of natural and anthropogenic components. 
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Figure 25.Atmospheric concentration of methane (CH4) in parts per billion [ppb]. 1750-
1980 – pseudo-hyperbolic trajectory ( 135.007 10C   , 20 1.072 10a
  and 
5
1 1.587 10a
 ). 1980 – deceleration and diversion to a slower, second-order 
exponential trajectory ( 20 7.863 10a   , 
1
1 7.915 10a
  , 42 1.973 10a
  ). 
Around 2006 – predicted maximum. There is a sign of a renewed increase. Methane 
emissions are made of natural and anthropogenic components. 
 
 
 
Figure 26.Loss of stratospheric ozone. 1956-1992 – exponential increase described by 
parameters 541.139 10c  and 26.446 10r  ). 1992 – deceleration and diversion to a 
slower and possibly decreasing trajectory. 
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Figure 27.Ocean acidification, described by the concentration of hydrogen ions ( H  ) in 
nmol/kg. 1850-1965 – hyperbolic trajectory ( 13.553 10a   and 41.087 10k  ). 
Around1965 – acceleration and diversion to a faster hyperbolic trajectory ( 19.975 10a   
, 44.353 10k  ). Ocean acidification is made of natural and anthropogenic contributions. 
 
 
Figure 28.Global marine fish capture (in million tonnes per year). 1950-2010 – second-
order exponential trajectory ( 30 2.714 10a   , 
0
1 2.722 10a  , 
4
2 6.814 10a
  ). 
1997 – predicted maximum and decline. There was no sudden acceleration within this 
range of time. 
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Figure 29.Global shrimp production by aquaculture (in million tonnes). 1950-1989 – 
second-order exponential trajectory ( 40 1.220 10a  , 
1
1 1.255 10a   and 
3
2 3.226 10a
 ). 1989 – deceleration and diversion to a slower, exponential trajectory (
775.718 10c  , 
2
8.798 10r

 ). There was no sudden acceleration within this 
range of time but only sudden deceleration. 
 
 
 
Figure 30.Global loss of tropical forests (in percent of the forest area in 1700). 1750-1960 – 
exponential growth ( 112.337 10c  , 21.399 10r  ). 1960 – deceleration and diversion 
to a slower, exponential trajectory ( 69.640 10c  , 37.388 10r  ). There was no 
acceleration in the 1950sand no earlier take-off point. 
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Figure 31.Global agricultural land area (in per cent of the total land area). 1750-1850 –
exponential trajectory ( 67.357 10c  , 35.315 10r  ). 1850-1960 – marginally faster 
exponential growth ( 82.301 10c  , 38.428 10r  ). 1960 – deceleration and diversion 
to a slower, second-order exponential trajectory ( 20 1.007 10a   , 
2
1 9.847 10a

 , 
5
2 2.431 10a
  ). There was no prominent acceleration in the 1950s and no earlier 
take-off point. 
 
 
 
Figure 32.Temperature anomaly in degrees of Celsius is strongly irregular and 
unpredictable. The overall trend was determined by the analysis of gradient. It is 
represented by the second order polynomial ( 20 1.676 10a  , 
1
1 1.786 10a
  , 
5
2 4.747 10a
 ). This overall trend should not be used to calculate the future 
temperature anomaly. 
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